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Changing conditions in the angel market offer a unique opportunity to further knowledge and 
understanding about angel investing in the US during times of economic volatility.  To identify 
trends in the angel market, this research examines changes in characteristics and investment 
behavior during a time of market expansion and contraction (2000 to 2001).  While business 
angels remain the leading source of seed capital for business ventures, depressed yield rates and 
increased due diligence indicate that investors are retreating to more fundamental approaches.  
 
Introduction 
The increase in entrepreneurial activity in the United States during the 1998 to 2000 
period was notable in size, scale, and velocity.  The critical role of early stage equity financing 
in this expansionary period, and throughout the history of the entrepreneurial economy, has 
been noted by researchers (Freear and Wetzel (1990); Sohl (1999); Harrison and Mason 
(2000)).  There are two major external sources of private equity capital for business ventures: 
business angels and venture capital funds.  Business angels represent the oldest, and largest 
source of seed and equity capital for the high growth venture (Harrison and Mason (2000); Sohl 
(2003)).  Complementary to the angel market is the institutional venture capital market, which 
invests primarily in the later stage of a firm‟s development (Timmons and Sapienza (1992); 
Meyer et al. (1995); Timmons and Bygrave (1997)).  Together, angels and venture capitalists 
provide the majority of high risk equity capital for entrepreneurial ventures.  During the 
expansion leading up to 2000, angel and venture capital investment activity surpassed previous 
industry records at unprecedented and unsustainable rates.  Total venture capital investments 
increased nearly 15 fold in six years, from US$6.3 billion in 1995 to US$90 billion in 2000 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers (2001)).  The number of deals funded by the venture capital industry 
increased less rapidly, from 1,128 deals in 1995 to 5,485 in 2000, a five fold increase, or one-
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third of the increase in the dollars invested.  In 2000, angel investments were estimated to be 
approximately US$40 billion.  For the first time in over a decade, venture capital investment 
dollars exceeded those of the angel market (Sohl (2003)).  During this expansionary period, the 
number of angel portals, categorized by the predominant mechanism for bringing together 
entrepreneurs seeking capital and business angels searching for investment opportunities, grew 
by more than 60% (Sohl, Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000)).   
The 2000-2001 downturn in the economy, after a period of strong growth, offers a 
unique opportunity to further knowledge and understanding of angel investing through a 
comparison of activities during the two periods.  There is strong evidence that start-up firms 
contributed significantly to the long period of economic growth in the 1990s (Progressive 
Policy Institute (1999)).  The downturn, especially acute in the start-up sector, signified 
considerable changes in the early stage equity markets, both for angels and venture capitalists.  
The venture capital industry contracted significantly, with 2001 investments falling to US$36 
billion (in 3,928 deals), a 60% decline from 2000, and a retraction to 1999 investment levels in 
both investment dollars and number of investments (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002). Angel 
investments have shown similar declines in terms of dollars invested (US$30 billion in 50,000 
deals), but have not declined as sharply in terms of number of investments (Kaiser (2002)). 
This expansion and contraction offers a unique opportunity to further knowledge and 
understanding about angel investing in the US during times of economic volatility.  How and 
why the angel market changed offers key insights into some of the contributing factors of early 
stage investment resiliency and vulnerability during difficult economic periods.  The expansion 
and contraction offered both opportunities and challenges and allowed investors to change their 
fundamental approach toward private equity financing.  Many new, perhaps less sophisticated, 
investors entered during the market upswing.  Many experienced angels altered fundamental 
screening and due diligence methods.  As the private equity market began to overheat, 
investment activity dramatically increased to levels that proved to be unsustainable.  Relaxation 
of past risk-reducing methods of diligent proposal analysis seemed to fuel the market upswing, 
as well as the eventual fallout.  The excessives of the rising market gave investors good reason 
to retool their “new economy” approaches and retreat back to the fundamentals.  Astute angels 
began to rethink their strategies and retrench for the future. 
This change in angel investment behavior generates many critical questions.  How did 
angel groups and investor networks alter their investment strategies since the pinnacle of the 
last economic expansion?  What methods are employed for deal sourcing by the angel groups 
in the post expansion period?  Has the angel market entered a more realistic phase with greater 
scrutiny by investors and better preparation of entrepreneurs when seeking equity capital?  Is 
the market expanding or contracting in reaction to the excessives of 2000?  With the hope of 
improving efficiency in the private equity market, this study aims to answer these questions 
through an analysis of the activity of angel portals in 2000 and 2001 and offer insights on the 
current state of the business angel market.  These two time periods (2000 and 2001) provide an 
opportunity to enhance the knowledge of angel investing and to develop an understanding of 
early stage investment resiliency and vulnerability during difficult economic periods. 
 
I. Hypotheses development 
Angel investors have been identified as the major source of seed and start-up capital for 
entrepreneurial ventures in the US, with investment amounts in the US$100,000 to US$1 
million range (Harrison and Mason (2000); Sohl (2003)).  The motivation for this seed and 
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start-up stage investing is the opportunity to start businesses and play a role in the 
entrepreneurial process (Mason and Harrison (1994); Landstrom (1997)) and the chance to act 
as an entrepreneur in the investment process (Politis and Landstrom (2002)).  Business angels 
often act as financial intermediaries assessing of small business quality through a variety of 
activities, including screening, contracting and monitoring, and help address broader 
information problems inherent to the private equity market (Berger and Udell (1998)).   
In the United Kingdom it has been estimated that during the 1999-2000 period, close to 
60% of angel investments were at the seed and start-up stage and over 75% of these 
investments involved amounts less than US$200,000 (Mason (2001)).  More recently, this 
threshold for early stage investments during 2000 has been raised to US$500,000 (Mason and 
Harrison (2002a)), which is, in part, a reflection of the rise in valuations during the economic 
upswing.  While the threshold amount is of interest, the role of angels as providers of seed and 
early stage risk capital is the focus.  In a Canadian study, more than 60% of angel investments 
were in the seed or start-up stage (Feeney, Haines and Riding (1999)).  The funding importance 
of business angels has been even greater in recent years as the venture capital segment has 
shifted focus away from start-ups and early stage firms in favor of more mature ventures (Van 
Osnabrugge (2000); Sapienza et al. (1996)) and angels have been recognized as occupying a 
critical place in the private equity financing spectrum (Brophy (1997); Berger and Udell 
(1998); Sohl (1999); Mason and Harrison (2000a)). 
While angels have been predominately seed and start-up investors, there is reason to 
hypothesize that angels may be participating in later stages at a higher frequency.  As venture 
capital investments continued to increase in deal size during the study period, a substantial 
secondary gap in the private equity market has developed in the $2-$5 million range (Sohl 
(2003)).  Companies that have successfully secured seed and start-up capital are finding 
increasing difficulties in securing follow-on funding.  With the venture capital industry needing 
to hold funds for additional rounds for portfolio companies and deal size increasing, this 
secondary gap is not being filled by the venture capital industry.  Further support for the 
potential retreat of angels from the seed and start-up market is that first sequence investments 
(first time investment in a particular company) by venture capital funds decreased from 41% in 
2000 to 24% in 2001 (PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002)), indicating that nearly three quarters of 
venture capital investments are in companies that are already in their portfolios.  Thus, angels 
may be called upon to provide a second round of financing beyond the seed and start-up stage.  
The salient question is if this represents a possible restructuring of the angel market, with a 
reallocation away from the seed and start-up stage, or an increasing role for angels as both 
seed/start-up investors and second round providers of capital.  If angels are reacting to this 
stage and first sequence migration by venture capitalist, one may expect business angel 
investors to shift their strategies toward follow-on investments, and thus reduce their 
proportional amount of seed/start-up investments.  These trends in the private equity market 
lead to the formulation of the first hypothesis: 
 
H1:  Business angels continue to invest primarily in the seed and start-up investment stage. 
 
An important component of the early stage equity market is the existence of the funding 
gap in the seed and start-up stage (Freear and Wetzel (1990); Mason and Harrison (2000b); 
Sohl (2003)).  This gap has been interpreted as a consequence of market inefficiency (Wetzel 
(1986); Wetzel (1987)) and is in part due to the increase in marginal transaction costs 
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experienced by large venture capital firms.  The existence of private investors and indications 
that capital is available, but quality deal flow is lacking (Mason and Harrison (1994); Sohl 
(1999)), suggests that this persistent funding gap is, in part, due to the inefficient flow of 
information.  In the informal venture capital market, with the suppliers of capital seeking a 
degree of anonymity, often in conflict with the need to maintain quality deal flow, information 
can flow very inefficiently.  Additionally, the significant information asymmetries inherent in 
the private equity market highlights the importance of the principle-agent relationship and 
allows for significant agency risks, particularly adverse selection problems.  Amit et al.‟s 
(1990) examination of the implications of this relationship between entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists found that the adverse selection problem created allowed for the less profitable 
ventures to be sold to venture capitalists and the more profitable ones to be retained by the 
more skillful entrepreneurs.  Thus, angels may attempt to overcome these inherent difficulties 
with an increased reliance on personal communications with the entrepreneur and the ability to 
judge their character through face-to-face communications and interactions in a variety of 
settings.   
As a means of increasing the efficiency in the angel market and given the growing 
availability, and usage, of electronic communication, it has been suggested that the angel 
market could benefit through the use of the Internet as a major tool for deal sourcing.  Prior to 
the last economic cycle, research indicates that electronic networks in the private equity market 
had been largely unsuccessful, with less than 1% of equity raised in 1997 being attributed to 
on-line sourcing (Private Equity Week (1998)).  Also, the angel market has historically been 
one that conducts business on a face-to-face level for both deal sourcing (Freear, Sohl and 
Wetzel (1994); Coveney and Moore (1998); Reitan and Sorheim (2000); Sorheim and 
Landstrom (2001); Günther (2005)) and investment decisions (Landstrom (1992); Fiet (1995a); 
Harrison and Mason (2002)).  Likewise, angels rely more on the entrepreneur in the investment 
decision.  Since the investment is in the seed and start-up stage, there is a paucity of financial 
history, past performance data and the absence of a track record of growth performance.  As 
such, angels tend to depend on the entrepreneur to protect them from losses due to market risk 
and are thus more concerned with agency risk than market risk (Fiet (1995b)).  Thus, the 
influence of electronic communication as a method to provide for more efficient investment 
proposal evaluations, the impact of agency risk and the adverse selection problem, leads to the 
investigation of the process of angel deal sourcing and investing. 
 
H2:  Angel deal sourcing and investing remains a face-to-face exercise. 
 
During the surge of investment activity taking place in 2000, there was a general 
consensus that this frantic pace may have contributed to less than optimal decision making by 
angel investors (Sohl (2003)).  Likewise, it is surmised that the post 2000 effect ushered in a 
more realistic phase with greater scrutiny by investors and better preparation of entrepreneurs 
when seeking equity capital.  The expansion and contraction offered both opportunities and 
challenges and allowed for fundamental changes in private equity financing for both the supply 
(angel) and demand (entrepreneur) side.  These changes can best be determined through an 
examination of yield rates, due diligence procedures and entrepreneur expectations. 
The yield (acceptance) rate is defined as the percentage of investment opportunities that 
are brought to the attention of investors (by the angel organization) that resulted in an 
investment.  Based on data collected on angel investments in Norway from 1995 to 1998, yield 
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rates for investment proposals were estimated to be 16.4% (Sorheim and Landstrom (2001)).  
In an earlier study of UK angels, yield rates were determined to be 6% (Mason and Harrison 
(1994)), although this estimate was based on a sample of only 35 investments by a small group 
of angels.  The only study to date on US angel yield rates focused on referral efficiency and 
determined acceptance rates based on the source of the deal flow (Freear, Sohl and Wetzel 
(1994)).  In Australia, angel yield rates during the 1990 to 1994 period increased from a low of 
12% to a peak in 1994 of 31% (Hindle and Wenban (1999)).  In a larger study of Canadian 
private investors, the yield was determined to be 11.6%.  However, it should be noted that the 
average size of Canadian angel investments is at least twice the size of those in the US, which 
stems from Canadian securities laws that financially penalize smaller deals (Riding et al. 
(1997)).  In a study based on angel activity during the market uptake, business angels identified 
two important elements in the initial screening stage: the extent to which the proposal meets 
their personal investment criteria and the intuitive assessment of the proposal.  Although this 
stage took only about ten minutes, 27% of proposals resulted in an investment (Mason and 
Harrison (2000c)).  In a post 2000 study in the UK, over 80% of investment proposals were 
rejected due to poor quality (Mason and Harrison (2002a)).  While these studies are insightful, 
it is argued that these European countries did not experience the volatility of the private equity 
markets that existed in the US.  
In any discussion of yield rates, it is important to note that both the number of 
investment proposals considered (the denominator) and the number invested (the numerator) 
play an important role.  In hyperactive markets the demand for capital increases as more 
entrepreneurs seek to take advantage of both the perceived increase in the supply of private 
equity and the increase in the probability to reach liquidity.  Liquidity in this context is an exit 
through either a merger, acquisition or initial public offering (IPO).  Similarly, the supply of 
capital is increased through a higher frequency of previously successful exits (which provide a 
source of capital for angel investments) and the desire to reach liquidity during current market 
conditions.  Thus, the demand for capital increases, while at the same time the supply is 
increased.  The rate of investment also increases as a result of the perceived opportunity for a 
profitably and timely liquidity event.  The combination of these factors contributes to a possible 
increase in the yield rate during times of expansion.  Conversely, yield rates during markets 
contracting should experience an opposite effect. On the supply side, as contraction in the IPO 
and M&A markets decrease the probability of a swift and lucrative liquidity event, capital is 
reserved for possible additional rounds of financing for the survival of portfolio companies.  In 
addition, the decrease in the likelihood of liquidity promotes both a more cautious and more 
discriminating approach to investment decisions.  Unfortunately, the demand side may not react 
as quickly to these market changes.  That is, entrepreneurs are still developing ventures based 
on the robust expansion of 2000.  Compounding this effect is that entrepreneurs are inclined to 
present their proposals to more angels, since the prospects for financing are diminished, 
requiring a wider search for capital.  Further contributing to the conditions effecting the yield 
rate is the due diligence process (hypothesis 4).  In markets with more scrutiny for the quality 
of the venture in the liquidity event, as experienced by the decline of IPOs during the post 2000 
period, there is an increased time to conduct this more through due diligence. As such, the 
longer it takes the angel investor to conduct due diligence, the smaller the number of 
investments that can be reviewed, contributing to a lower yield rate.  Thus, pressure from both 
the increase in the demand (denominator), the decrease in the supply (numerator) of capital for 
new ventures, and the more cautious approach to due diligence, should contribute to a decrease 
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in the yield rate.  This suggests the following hypothesis for US investment yield rates during 
especially unstable periods of economic activity: 
 
H3:  Yield rates in the angel market inflate in overactive markets. 
 
In one of the earliest studies of the angel investment process in the US, due diligence is 
calculated as the time between the first meeting of the angel and entrepreneur, and the receipt 
of the investment funds (Freear, Sohl and Wetzel (1995)).  The median elapsed time was 2.5 
months for private investors (4.5 months for venture capital funds), with the shorter 
deliberation time for due diligence for angel deals being attributed to the smaller number of 
people involved in the decision process and the fact that angels tend to invest in fields with 
which they are familiar (Freear, Sohl and Wetzel (1995)).  In the UK, the time for angels to 
conduct due diligence was two months and the research also confirmed that venture capitalists 
take longer, for many of the same reasons as outlined in the US study (Van Osnabrugge 
(2000)).  This length of time to conduct due diligence is commonly used as an indication of the 
thoroughness of the due diligence process (Douglas and Shepherd (2002); Mason and Harrison 
(2002b)). 
Due diligence may be effected by markets experiencing changes in a relatively short 
period of time.  Many new, perhaps less sophisticated, investors entered during the market 
upswing and experienced angels altered fundamental screening and due diligence methods.  
Spurred on by the hot IPO market and the increasing competition for deals, the pressure to 
make the investments increased and the time devoted to due diligence decreased.  Due 
diligence appeared to become an after-thought and anecdotes of due diligence completed in 
short periods of time began to appear (Sohl (2003)).  In the market expansion period, external 
signals to the private investor may confound the due diligence process and result in a reduction 
in the thoroughness of due diligence.  In essence, through the signaling that current market 
conditions (robust IPOs with large returns) translate into the perception that the ventures are of 
higher quality, then one would take less time to reach the investment decision.  The inclination 
is to invest, since the opportunities must be good.  This is in contrast to the normal assessment 
by the private investor that the level of risk is substantial, the chance for failure high, and the 
modus operandi being the proposal is not of high quality and due diligence must prove that the 
venture can overcome this conception.  Thus, in markets that are in contraction, ventures are 
deemed to be a lower quality and more time is needed to screen these investment opportunities.  
It is surmised that relaxation of past risk-reducing methods of diligent proposal analysis seemed 
to fuel the market upswing, as well as the eventual fallout.   
 
H4:  Due diligence is more carefully measured during contracting markets. 
 
Angel research has come to the general conclusion that most active business angels are 
unable to invest as frequently as they would wish because of a lack of suitable business 
proposals (Mason and Harrison (1994); Sohl (1999); Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000)). 
This has led to a determination that entrepreneurs often are not “investor ready” (Mason and 
Harrison (1999)).  The main deficiencies that investors note in the proposals are that the 
business plans contain unrealistic assumptions or information that is not credible and that the 
entrepreneur/management team lacks credibility (Mason and Harrison (2002a); Mason and 
Stark (2004)).  In general, entrepreneurs appear to be unrealistic in their assumptions of the 
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business concept and growth prospects (Mason and Rogers (1997); Feeney et al. (1999); Cassar 
(2004)).  The main reason cited by UK angels as to why the investment was not made was 
because the angel and entrepreneur could not agree on the price (total amount of funding) of the 
deal (Mason and Harrison (2002a)).  One would surmise that this lack of realism is exacerbated 
in hyperactive markets and mitigated in declining markets.  One potential measure of the 
degree of realism in the entrepreneur‟s search for growth capital is the difference between the 
funding sought by the entrepreneur (deal size sought) and the actual amount invested in the 
deal (deal size invested) by the angel. 
An additional consideration in the examination of the difference between the amount of 
funding sought and the amount obtained is the staging of private equity investments.  Angels 
and venture capitalists employ an assortment of strategies to reduce the significant risks 
associated with venture investing, and investment stage considerations can be significant when 
evaluating agency risks (Gompers (1995)).   Since more information is available in developed 
firms, investments in later stage firms seem to reduce agency costs.  Staging of investments can 
be viewed as a control mechanism to manage these agency costs (Sahlman (1990)).  In contrast 
to angel deals, venture capitalists arm themselves with a variety of contract previsions and 
covenants (Sohl and Areson-Perkins (2001)) and set milestone contingency restrictions on the 
incremental amount of committed financing.  This staging of capital infusions affords the 
opportunity to gather information and assess the ventures progress, while maintaining the 
option to abandon the investment (Gompers (1995)).  As such, the size of the investment may 
be an indication of this staging strategy.  For venture capitalists the research indicates that early 
stage firms receive significantly less money per round, stage investments as a risk reducing and 
monitoring process, and maintain the ability to stop future financing when prospects for returns 
are negative (Gompers (1995)).  In a market in contraction, one would expect these staging 
considerations to play an even more significant role.  However, an important consideration is 
that angels do not possess the wealth of capital afforded a venture capital fund, since angel 
investors are individuals, rather than investment funds.  Thus, angels do not necessarily have 
the financial resources to spread the investment over several stages.  It is possible that angels 
will reduce the amount for the initial round and spread the given amount over several tranches 
within a round, an event more likely in the angel market. 
Thus, the combination of the degree of realism in the entrepreneur‟s search for capital, 
the investor ready considerations of the angel investor and the staging of private equity 
investment as a risk reducing measure, lead to the development of the following hypothesis: 
 
H5:  (Deal size invested - deal size sought) approaches zero in post-hyperactive markets. 
 
II. Methodology 
Previous research has shown that angel investors prefer to invest in groups for an array 
of reasons, including the reduction of agency costs and risks, market risks, adverse selection 
risks, and transaction costs (Sohl, Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000)).  Prior to the late 
1990‟s these angel groups were informal gatherings of angels typically formed on a per 
investment deal basis.  Since 1998 there has been an increase in the more formal angel groups.  
These types of angel groups, or portals, include formal matching services and “named” angel 
groups and angel alliances that meet regularly to review investment opportunities.  While only 
10 recognized angel groups existed in 1996, these ranks have grown to close to 140 in 2000 and 
2001.  Data for this research was collected from a variety of angel portals that were widely 
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disbursed throughout the US.  The organizations participating in the study averaged just over 
100 angel investors with diverse investing approaches and practices.  While not all business 
angels source their investments through angel portals, the activity that takes place in and 
around these portals is a reasonable representation of angel market behavior.  The portals 
participating in the study reported a growing number of members.  A percentage (25% to 40%) 
of this growth includes latent investors who are not actively investing in the years covered by 
this research.  These novice investors, who lack the extensive social networks, may be attracted 
to these organizations because it may enable them to find sufficient deal flow.  However, the 
active investors, comprising 60% to 75% of the angel organizations, were seasoned investors 
significantly contributing to market activity.  Additionally, the active investors not only 
invested with other members of the organization, they also invest with angels outside of the 
organization.  As such, it appears that the findings, although based on angel groups, are 
representative of the more general angel population. 
As a means of portraying activities within the current state of the business angel market 
in the US and to test the hypotheses outlined in the previous section, a survey-based approach 
was employed.  This survey was divided into two sections, the characteristics of the angel 
organization and the characteristics of the individual investors that are members of the 
organization.  The survey was directed towards angel portals, which can be categorized 
according to the predominant mechanism for bringing together entrepreneurs seeking capital 
and business angels searching for investment opportunities.  These mechanisms include formal 
matching services that match entrepreneurs with investors through a data base, angel groups 
that meet regularly to review opportunities (angel alliances), organizations that facilitate the 
angel investment process by organizing meetings or events that bring together both angel 
investors and entrepreneurs, and Internet-only networks.  The operational practices and 
performance were articulated through industry preferences, membership and their participation 
rate, yield rates, deal sourcing and related investment activity.  Data collected that described 
member investor characteristics included stage preference, due diligence procedures, 
valuations, deal size and participation by women entrepreneurs and investors.  To compare 
angel investor‟s approach, activities, behaviors and performance over time, the survey 
instrument collected data for years 2000 and 2001.  This data collection for the two time 
periods was accomplished with one survey instrument.  Thus, the longitudinal data represents 
data from the same respondents, which facilitates the comparisons across the two time periods.  
These two time periods (2000 and 2001) provide an opportunity to develop an understanding of 
early stage investment resiliency and vulnerability during volatile economic periods. 
A comprehensive questionnaire was distributed to 174 of the known private investor 
clubs, angel alliances and matching networks in the US.  Each organization was contacted on 
multiple occasions and through various mediums.  A letter of introduction sent through US 
mail was the initial contact.  The actual questionnaire followed, also through US mail.  For 
those organizations that did not respond to the first questionnaire, a second copy of the 
questionnaire, accompanied with a letter of encouragement, was distributed.  Email messages, 
with a copy of the questionnaire attached, were sent to all possible groups who did not respond 
to the first two requests.  Telephone contact was established with groups who did not respond 
to any previous attempts.  In most circumstances, either the CEO or lead member of the 
management team was the primary contact and the individual who completed the survey.  This 
participation of high-level management was considered essential in order to assure the accuracy 
of the responses.   
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Of the 174 organizations, 126 were confirmed to exist.  Of these 126, 47 surveys were 
returned, representing a response rate of 37%.  To access the potential for non-response bias, 
non-respondents were contacted.  Ten percent of the non-respondents contacted provided 
reasons for their non-response. The largest category of non-respondents (80%) was those that 
considered that the data requested does not apply to their type of organization.  For the 
remaining non-respondents, the reasons for non-response included those that do collect data 
and were therefore unable to provide the information for the survey (9%) and those that were 
no longer active (9%). Any within survey time related non-response bias was also evaluated.  
In this contact, the early respondents (the first half of the data for the survey) were compared to 
the late respondents (the last half of the respondents).  It is surmised that those responding late 
to the survey, after a follow-up contact, would be most similar to non-respondents.  For each of 
the years and responses germane to this research there appeared to be no significant differences 
between the responses of these two groups. 
The respondents represented a diverse set with respect to geographic location and 
organizational structure and as such, the sample appears to adequately represent the 
disbursement of angel activity in the US.  With respect to organizational structure, 55% of the 
respondents are classified as organizations that facilitate the angel investment process by 
organizing meetings or events that bring together both angel investors and entrepreneurs, and 
36% are considered to be angel groups that meet regularly to review opportunities (angel 
alliances).  In contrast, 9% are formal matching services that match entrepreneurs with 
investors through a data base and none of the organizations can be classified as Internet-only 
networks. 
This dispersion of the types of angel organizations with respect to the meeting and deal 
enactment format is representative of the population of angel portals.  A compilation of existing 
angel organizations in the US, that is the closest in time to the 2000 and 2001 survey, was 
conducted in 1998 (Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000)).  The research, with respect to the 
structure of angel organizations, indicates that 54% of the angel organizations are classified as 
organizations that facilitate the angel investment process, 24% are formal matching services, 
21% are angel groups, and 1% of the organizations can be classified as Internet-only networks 
(Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000)).  This compilation compares favorably with the 
2000/2001 survey results, except for the larger number of angel groups (36% in 2000/2001 
versus 21% in 1998) and matching networks (9% versus 24%).  However, research indicates 
that in the period between 1998 and 2000 there was a marked increase in the number of angel 
groups and at the same time a decline in the number of matching networks (Sohl (forthcoming); 
Amatucci and Sohl (forthcoming)).  Since the sample emulates the structure of the angel 
portals, this lends support for the credibility of the results, with respect to angel portals. 
The methodology is open to a potential source of bias since individuals that are 
members of angel portals or groups may not be representative of the general population of 
business angels.  There are several reasons to indicate that this potential bias is mitigated.  First, 
portals are in essence a manifestation of the historical syndication characteristic of the angel 
market.  Portals were developed as a way to formalize a process that was in existence since the 
initiation of the study of angels in the early 1980s (Wetzel (1983)).  Second, previous research 
indicates that there are few differences between angels that are members of portals and those 
who are not (Van Osnabrugge (1998)).  Third, to assure a representative sample, the data was 
derived from a variety of angel organizations.  These organizations include significant 
differences with respect to size (number of members), organization structure (highly organized 
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with formal bylaws to informal collections of angels), regions (geographical diversity), 
investment objectives (sector specific to a wide range of sectors) and age (organizations 
founded over a decade ago to those in the last few years).  Fourth, to assess the investment 
activity of the members of the angel organizations the respondents indicated the percentage of 
their angels that are making investments.  In 2000, the median percentage of members actively 
investing was 70% and in 2001 it was 80%.  Thus, active investors comprised the majority of 
the members of the angel organizations and were significantly contributing to market activity 
with their track record of investment activity.  Lastly, angels typically invest with five to seven 
other angels as a means to mitigate agency risks, costs and market risks (Sohl, Van Osnabrugge 
and Robinson (2000)).  As such, the angels not only invest with other members of the 
organization, they also invest with angels outside of the organization as a risk reduction 
strategy (Sohl, Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000)).   
Another potential bias is that the respondents are the executive directors or presidents of 
the angel clubs.  In most cases, these administrators are also active investors.  In all cases, it is 
the role of the administrator to have an intimate understanding of the workings and activity of 
the membership.  These individuals are responsible for many activities, including organizing 
screening committees, assisting in forming investment syndicates, participating in the due 
diligence process, assisting in the valuation exercise and tracking the deal.  Through a close 
working relationship with the members and lead investors, these administrators are in the 
unique position to view the activities of the organization through an organizational lens, rather 
than the myopic view as an individual investor in a single deal.  As such, they are able to 
provide detailed activity information from an organizational perspective. 
 
III. Analysis 
 A. Stage and deal sourcing 
Seed financing is the relatively small amounts of equity capital provided to an 
entrepreneur to prove a concept and to qualify for start-up capital.  This capital is often used to 
support exploration of a concept before the venture is in operation.  Start-up capital typically 
enables the venture to proceed from the research and development phase to initial production 
and limited sales, including the completion of product development and initial marketing.  In 
both of these stages there exists a substantial amount of risk, including both the risk of 
discovery and the question of whether a cost effective manufacturing process can be 
implemented.  Angels have traditionally been the largest source of seed and start-up stage 
capital in the US, with investments typically below the US$1 million threshold.  However, 
given the recent volatility and poor investment performance, angels may have been inclined to 
retreat from these high risk investment stages.  These developments lead to H1: Business 
angels continue to invest primarily in the seed and start-up investment stage.  Based on the data 
collected for 2000 and 2001, there appears to be substantial support for H1 (Table I).  The data 
indicate that angels, through their membership in angel portals, continue to favor the early 
stages, with 51% of the 2000 angel portal investments, and 45% for 2001, in seed and start-up 
stage entrepreneurial ventures.  This represents the largest stage for angel investment activity.  
Further support for H1 can be garnered from complimentary data from the venture capital 
industry.  In 2000, investments by venture capitalists in the seed and start-up stage represented 
3% of the total dollars invested and 8% of the total investments made, and for 2001, 2% of 
dollars and 5.1% of deals (PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002)).  It should be noted that angel 
portal members also indicate a slight increase in later stage investing, up 10% from 2000 to 
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2001.  Clearly, angels are not retreating from seed and start-up investing, but it appears that 
market conditions are requiring angels to provide some follow-on financing for their 
investments.  First sequence investments (first time investment in a particular company) by 
venture capital funds decreased from 41% in 2000 to 24% in 2001 (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2001)), indicating that nearly three quarters of venture capital investments are in companies 
that are already in their portfolios.  Thus, angels are often required to provide some additional 
rounds of financing, and this is reflected in the slight increase in angel investments in the later 
stage. 
This preference for seed and start-up investing impacts the process of deal sourcing and 
investment decisions.  In the informal venture capital market, with the suppliers of capital 
seeking a degree of anonymity often in conflict with the need to maintain quality deal flow, 
information flows very inefficiently.  In addition, the inherent nature of seed investing is one 
that has information asymmetries with adverse selection problems and significant agency and 
market risk.  Also, the lack of a company track record, and the absence of a product, since the 
stage is essentially a proof of concept, adds to the information asymmetries, as does the 
situation that the major assets of the venture are the intellectual property of the entrepreneur.  
These inefficiencies may be an unavoidable consequence of the stage of the market.  To 
overcome these inefficiencies angels have traditionally relied on personal networks, as stated in 
H2, Angel deal sourcing and investing remains a face-to-face exercise.  However, given the 
increased availability, and usage of electronic communication, it has been suggested that the 
angel market could benefit through the use of the Internet as a major tool for deal sourcing.  
Also, research has indicated that business angels may have limited access to deal flow relative 
to venture capitalists (Fiet (1995b)) and the use of more efficient deal sourcing methods could 
allow angels access to a larger pool of deals.  To test hypothesis 2, the angel portals categorized 
the primary deal sourcing and investment process method that is employed.  Clearly, H2 is 
supported, and angels remain committed to face-to-face interaction, with 70% of the portals 
(Table II) relying on some form of high-touch mechanism as their primary matching method.  
Specifically, 38% of the portals utilize venture forums (entrepreneurs making presentations to 
groups of investors) and 32% rely on personal networking among angels to both source deals 
and enact the investment decision.  The prevalence of the venture forum and personal network 
process of generating deal flow is testament to the hands-on nature of the angel market and the 
importance of the entrepreneur and the management team in the success of these high-risk 
ventures.  In addition, the venture forums and personal networks offer a degree of vetting of the 
deal and thus help to increase the quality, as opposed to the volume, of the deal being offered.  
Further support for H2 is evident through the lack of widespread use of the Internet.  Only 11% 
of the portals indicate the use of the Internet as the primary matching method, and none of the 
respondents indicate that they would consider their organization to be an Internet-only 
operation.  In addition, none of the portals rely on newsletters to transmit deal opportunities.   
Since business angels attach a greater level of importance to agency risks than venture 
capitalists (Fiet (1995b)) this lends additional support to the more intimate face-to-face nature 
of business angel deal activity.   Also, since angel‟s screening and deal evaluation is largely 
focused on the competencies of the entrepreneur, then interactions that allows for the greatest 
amount of primary information gathering about the entrepreneur, such as face-to-face 
information exchanges, may be prudent.  Although a variety of information technology, 
including the Internet, can reduce both transaction and agency costs, it seems that the value 
angels still receive from personal interaction with entrepreneurs throughout the deal screening 
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and negotiations continues to outweigh the relative inefficiency of this personal 
communication.  
 
 B. The investment process 
While a rise in investment activity in 2000 may have contributed to less than optimal 
decision making by angels, the post 2000 period may have ushered in a more realistic phase 
with greater scrutiny by investors and better preparation of entrepreneurs when seeking equity 
capital.  The expansion and contraction may have provided the foundation for fundamental 
changes in private equity financing for both the supply (angel) and demand (entrepreneur) side.  
These changes can best be determined through an examination of yield rates, due diligence 
procedures and entrepreneur expectations. 
The yield (acceptance) rate is defined as the percentage of investment opportunities that 
are brought to the attention of investors (by the angel organization) that resulted in an 
investment.  Considering investment behavior during the height of the investment bubble in 
2000, one would expect to see relatively high yield rates during this time period.  The data from 
this study confirm this perception (Table III).  In 2000, the yield rate reached 23.3%, which was 
significantly higher than any other year examined.  Reviewing statistics for 1997 and 1998, 
years preceding the bubble, reveals lower yield rates of 12% and 14%, respectively (Sohl, Van 
Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000)).  As conjectured, after the bubble in 2001, yields dropped to 
10.79%.  These data appear to support H3, yield rates in the angel market inflate in overactive 
markets.  In addition, analysis of the yield data reveals that the significant drop in the yield 
ratio was caused by pressure from both the numerator and the denominator.  In 2001, 
investment groups present investors 29% more investment proposals than in 2000, and 
investors executed 43% fewer deals than 2000.  Thus, pressure from both the increase in the 
demand (denominator), the decrease in the supply (numerator) of capital for new ventures, and 
the more cautious approach to due diligence (see below), contribute to a decrease in the yield 
rate. 
The decrease in the actual deal investment activity in 2001 may be the result of a 
number of factors, including more patience in the performance of due diligence, a more 
measured approach to angel investing, and knowledge gained from the high failure rates of the 
post bubble investments.  Analyzing the length of time angels spend evaluating deal proposals 
may further support these ideas.  Survey results indicate that angels spent, on average, close to 
an extra month, or 25% more time (Table IV), on performing due diligence in 2001 than they 
did in 2000.  These data lend support to H4, due diligence is more measured in markets in 
contraction.  In real time, the average length of time angels spend considering an investment 
opportunity has increased from 3.3 months, in 2000, to 4.1 months, in 2001, although this 
difference is only partially supported (p value = 0.109).  However, relative to other private 
equity investors, angels spend the least amount of time in this process (Freear, Sohl and Wetzel 
(1995); Van Osnabrugge (2000)).  Survey results illustrate that it took venture capitalists and 
corporate investors, on average, five and six months, respectively, to close a deal in 2001.  
Similarly, both of these groups reported an increase in this time period of one month from 
2000.  This does not necessarily indicate that angels are less diligent than their venture capital 
counterparts, but it may suggest that they are more efficient. 
For the demand (entrepreneur) side, one would also expect a retrenching behavior with 
more realistic expectations when seeking equity capital from business angels.  To gauge this 
possible change in expectations, data is collected that reflects the average amount invested, per 
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deal, for all the investments enacted by the angel portals in the survey.  These data are 
compared to the average funding sought by entrepreneurs that presented investment 
opportunities to the member angels.  It is assumed that major discrepancies between 
entrepreneur expectations and investment amounts were either reconciled during the 
negotiation phase or resulted in a failure to conclude the investment.  It should be noted that in 
this instance, this is the one case where data are derived from two different samples, although 
the design and implementation of the surveys were close to identical.  The respondent profiles 
are also similar across these two samples (1998 and 2001) with respect to angel portal 
characteristics.  Thus, the sample design allows for comparisons to be made, while mitigating 
the potential for any bias due to different sample frames or respondent profile characteristics. 
In 1998, entrepreneurs, on average, estimated funding needs at the seed and start-up stage to be 
US$826,042 and the average dollars invested per deal are US$142,167, representing a 
discrepancy of -US$683,875 (Sohl, Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000)).  In contrast, in 
2001, entrepreneurs, on average (Table V), estimate funding needs at the seed and start-up 
stage to be US$1,134,375 and the average dollars invested per deal are US$806,042, 
representing a discrepancy of -US$328,333, based on the current survey results.  There appears 
to be no support for H5, (deal size invested - deal size sought) approaches zero in post-
hyperactive markets.  The difference between the deal size invested and deal size sought is not 
statistically significant.  The supplier of capital and the entrepreneurs seeking investments (the 
demand side) appear to not have adjusted expectations from the hyperactive markets of 2000 
and earlier.  It appears that these angel deals are in need of further calibration.  It is of interest 
to note that while the focus of this analysis is on the difference between the deal size invested 
and the deal size sought, the growth in average dollars invested per deal is substantial.  Recall 
that 1998 was the initial stages of the expansion of the private equity markets and 2001, even 
though a down year, indicates a substantial increase in the dollars invested per deal.  It is 
important to note that 2001 is a down year in comparison to 2000, but not necessarily compared 
to 1998.  Data collected in the current sample reveals such.  Average dollars invested per year 
for 2000 was $934,045.  As noted, for 2001 it was $806,042.  Thus, the sample reflects this 
downturn in the market. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
The expansion of the private equity market leading up to 2000 and the subsequent 
downturn in 2001 provides a unique opportunity to increase our understanding of the angel 
market through an examination of market activities during this volatile period.  How the angel 
market characteristics and investment processes changed during this expansion and contraction 
was the focus of this research.  Regarding the stage of investments, it appears that individual 
investors, as members of angel portals, continue to be the major source of seed and start-up 
financing for entrepreneurial ventures.  In addition, angels are also providing some later rounds 
of equity capital, but this slight movement to later stages appears to be more out of necessity 
due to a lack of second round capital, rather than a fundamental change in investment attitudes.  
The research also supports the continued reliance on face-to-face interaction for deal sourcing 
and investing, possibly as a method to mitigate some of the information asymmetries and 
agency risk that is inherent in the angel market.  The angel investor appears to have reacted to 
the post 2000 decline by adopting measured approaches to the investment process.  These 
include a more cautious approach to due diligence and an increase in the scrutinizing of 
investment opportunities, as indicated by the decline in yield rates.  It is important to note that 
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these changes are in many ways a retreat to the investment fundamentals of the pre-2000 era, 
rather than a major restructuring of the industry.  In general, the angel market has emerged 
from the post 2000 contraction in a relatively healthy state, especially when compared to some 
of the severe restructuring experienced in the other components of the private equity market.   
While much has been learned from the examination of the angel market during the 
recent expansion and contraction in the economy, much remains in question.  This research was 
one of the first attempts to provide a longitudinal investigation of the angel market, especially 
during a time of economic volatility.  However, continued longitudinal data collection needs to 
be undertaken.  Current research, which relies largely on cross sectional analysis, should be 
supplemented with longitudinal research.  More extensive longitudinal angel research would 
allow for trend analysis and provide valuable insights on changing seed and start-up stage 
market conditions and angel organizational structure.  Thus, while the angel market appears to 
have emerged from the 2000-2001 restructuring in a reasonably sound state, continued research 
on market conditions is necessary to assure the sustainability of this critical market for seed and 
start-up investments in entrepreneurial ventures. 
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Investments by stage (percentage)     
  2000 2001 p value 
seed and start-up 51% 45% 0.667 
early 39% 34% 0.71 
later 9% 19% 0.308 







Primary matching methods (percentage) 
  2001 
internet 11% 
venture forums 38% 
newsletter/magazine 0% 














Yield rates (percentage)       
  2000 2001 p value 
n 33 34  
yield 23.26% 10.79% 0.001 
 







Time to evaluate deal proposals (months)     
  2000 2001 p value 
n= 24 29  
mean 3.3 4.1 0.109 












Deal size invested vs deal size sought     
  funding sought deal size difference 
1998       
n= 24 24  
mean $826,042 $142,167 -$683,875 
median $500,000 $75,000 -$412,500 
standard deviation $902,457 $137,226 $736,184 
        
2001       
n= 24 24  
mean $1,134,375 $806,042 -$328,333 
median $1,000,000 $450,000 -$287,500 
standard deviation $1,224,341 $1,175,284 $861,296 
    
p value (mean difference, 1998 vs 2001) 0.1304   
 
 
